Abstract-We formalize a new attack model for collusion secure codes, incorporating attacks on the underlying watermarking scheme as well as cut-and-paste attacks traditionally considered for collusion secure codes. We use this model to analyze the collusion resistance of two versions of the Tardos code, both for binary and nonbinary alphabets. The model allows us to consider different signal processing attacks on the content, namely the addition of noise and averaging attacks. The latter may result in content segments that have multiple watermarks embedded. We study two versions of the -ary Tardos code in which the accusation method has been modified so as to allow for the detection of multiple symbols in the same content segment. We show that both variants yield efficient codes in the new model, parametrized for realistic attacker strengths.
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I. INTRODUCTION

F
INGERPRINTING provides a means for tracing the origin and distribution of digital data. Before distribution of digital content, it is modified by applying an imperceptible fingerprint, which plays the role of a personalized serial number. The fingerprint is usually embedded through a watermarking algorithm. Once an unauthorized copy of the content is found, the identity of guilty users, who participated in the creation of the unauthorized copy, can be determined. The latter can be done using a tracing algorithm, which outputs a list of allegedly guilty users. This process is also known as "forensic watermarking."
Reliable tracing of content requires security against attacks that aim to remove the tracing information from a copy. Collusion attacks, where a group of pirates collude to compare their copies, are a particular threat. As any differences between the copies have to arise from the fingerprints and not the content, such a comparison gives information which can be used to remove the fingerprint. To counter this threat, coding theory has produced a number of collusion-secure codes (e.g., [1] and [2] ). In any practical implementation, they must be combined with some kind of embedding scheme, for instance a watermark. The resulting system has two layers [3] , [4] : The coding layer encodes user identities into a message and protects against collusion attacks. The underlying watermarking layer hides symbols of the message in segments of the content. Customarily, the interface between the fingerprinting code and the watermarking system has been specified in terms of the marking assumption plus additional assumptions that are referred to as a "model." The marking assumption states that the colluders are able to perform modifications only in those content segments where the colluders received differently marked content. These segments are called detectable positions. The "model" specifies the kind of symbol manipulations that the attackers are able to perform in detectable positions. The commonly used restricted digit model only allows them to choose pieces from their copies of the content; i.e., each segment of the unauthorized copy carries exactly one symbol that the attackers have available. The unreadable digit model allows for slightly stronger attacks. The attackers are also able to erase the fingerprint at detectable positions. Under the arbitrary digit model, the attackers can put arbitrary symbols in detectable positions, while the general digit model additionally allows erasures at detectable positions.
However, all these attack models fail to completely capture the properties of the watermarking layer. The mismatch is especially pronounced in the case of spread spectrum watermarks. First, the marking assumption does not always hold in practice, since signal processing attacks are occasionally able to remove a watermark symbol even in undetectable positions. Furthermore, signal processing attacks result in symbol errors in detectable positions that seem to match the general digit model at a first glance, even though the general digit model allows for unrealistically strong attacks. In practice, signal processing can induce the following symbol detection errors:
• If the colluders possess many differently watermarked copies of a segment, they have a good chance of erasing the watermark in that segment (e.g., by averaging attacks). However, if they choose to use an insufficient number of segments, some of the individual watermarks may remain detectable in the colluded copy.
• Depending on the detector threshold, "false positive" symbol detections can be induced by adding noise. Both detection errors occur with certain (low) probabilities. Even though the general digit model allows us to model these two errors, it assumes that attackers always have a 100% success rate, which is unrealistic. In view of this discrepancy between the potency of actual attacks on the one hand and the general digit model on the other hand, we formalize a new attack model for collusion-secure codes which we call the combined digit model; it allows for symbol errors with certain (parametrizable) probabilities, resulting from common attacks in the watermarking layer.
Xie et al. [5] addressed the imperfections of the watermarking layer as discussed above by allowing symbol mixing and introducing variants of the arbitrary-symbol Tardos code [6] together with a watermarking system. They also provided experimental results to validate the system. In this paper, we propose a similar (but slightly different) attacker model which we call the Combined Digit Model. We present experimental results showing that the attacker model is realistic. Furthermore, we analyze the Tardos code variants of [5] in our model and show that both result in efficient codes.
A. Related Work
Several collusion-secure codes have been proposed to counter collusion attacks against forensic tracking watermarks. Most notable are the codes proposed by Boneh and Shaw [1] and Tardos [2] . The former construction uses a concatenation of an inner code with a random outer code, while the latter one is a fully randomized binary code. Tardos [2] achieved a code length of , which is asympotically optimal. (Here denotes the number of colluders that can be resisted, and is the maximum allowed probability of accusing a fixed innocent user. 1 ) Furon et al. [7] presented an alternative view on the Tardos scheme, attempting to decipher the intuition behind the construction.
Blayer and Tassa [8] , Škorić et al. [6] , [9] , and Nuida et al. [10] showed how to significantly reduce the constant "100" in the code length. In [6] , Škorić et al. also provided a construction for nonbinary alphabets and a symbol-symmetric accusation strategy to reduce the code length even further. All these results were derived under the common assumption of the restricted digit model. As noted in [6] , the nonbinary Tardos code can also be analyzed in the unreadable digit model, where the colluders erase fingerprint symbols with 100% success rate in detectable positions. In this case, the required code length is considerably longer, which makes the scheme less practical. It must be noted, however, that the attackers in the unreadable digit model are unrealistically powerful.
Another attack model has been defined by Guth and Pfitzmann in [11] , which allows for some imperfections on the watermark layer. In effect, the Guth-Pfitzmann model allows the attackers to introduce "errors" with a certain, bounded probability in undetectable positions, thereby breaking the marking assumption. Their attacker model is less strong than the one we use; codes for their model, based on the construction of Boneh-Shaw, can be found in [4] and [11] .
Even though spread-spectrum watermarking is known to provide a certain level of collusion-security in itself, without the need for an additional coding layer, such solutions scale poorly in the number of users [12] when large coalitions are considered. Existing results have been limited to simulations up to about 5000 users. Kilian et al. [13] show that, if the watermarks have 1 Let be the number of users and the overall probability that a false positive occurs. Then , i.e., the code length depends on , but this is hidden in the definition of . a component-wise normal distribution, then differently marked copies are required to successfully erase any mark with non-negligible probability, where is the number of users.
He and Wu [3] have presented a joint system combining spread-spectrum fingerprinting with an outer collusion-secure code. The code they used, however, was designed for the restricted digit model, which clearly did not hold. The joint system performed well in simulations, but there is no theoretical analysis of the outer code performance in the system, nor of the choice and validity of the marking assumption.
In a series of papers (e.g., see [14] - [16] ), the performance of fingerprinting schemes was analyzed by methods from information theory. However, their attack channels are different from the attacks that we are considering.
Xie et al. [5] introduced some ingredients of the combined digit model in the context of a joint watermark/fingerprinting system. This model allows attackers to perform signal processing attacks on the content, in particular mixing several symbols in one position. They used the Broken Arrows watermarking system [17] and employed a -ary Tardos code. They introduced two alternative accusation methods, accepting multiple symbols from the watermark decoder for each segment. Their analysis was purely experimental. It showed that the two accusation methods both perform well against this type of attack. However, these results were optimistic because in these simulations the attackers were actually being forced to mix all available symbols instead of being allowed; this resulted in a weaker attack.
B. Contribution and Outline
In this paper, we formally introduce the combined digit model for fingerprinting. While the basic concepts of the model were proposed by Xie et al. [5] , in this paper we provide a precise mathematical formulation which facilitates a theoretical analysis of collusion-secure codes in the new attack model. The combined digit model is characterized by two features: First, colluders are allowed to add noise, which breaks the marking assumption with a small probability. Second, in a detectable position, the colluders may use more than one symbol to create their pirated version. In particular, they can choose to use a single symbol or a subset of all available symbols; depending on this choice, they either end up performing an erasure or creating a segment with a single or with several detectable watermarks. We, therefore, use a watermark detector that is able to detect multiple symbols in a segment. Furthermore, the noise they add gives rise to a small probability that a symbol gets detected which was not used in the attack. Simulation results confirm that such an attack model is realistic.
We show that two versions of the Tardos code introduced in [5] , which are extensions of the symbol-symmetric accusation method [6] , adapted to the detection of multiple symbols per segment, provide efficient codes for the new attack model. In particular, we analyze the two accusation methods based on a performance parameter which is linked to the minimum code length required to resist colluders. The performance parameter is based on the expectation value of the coalition's accusation sum and on the variance of an innocent user's accusation. These quantities are computed almost completely analytically, with one final numerical step. An important benefit of this approach is that it is possible to identify analytically a "worst case" pirate strategy that forces the content owner to use a long code.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we introduce the combined digit model and provide evidence from simulations that the model adequately captures the essential properties of coalition attacks. In Section III, we describe an efficient code for the new model, which we then analyze in Section IV.
II. THE ATTACK MODEL
A. Notation
Let be the alphabet of the fingerprinting code, be the number of users to be accommodated in the system, and the number of symbols in the fingerprint (the number of segments in the content). Furthermore, we denote with the maximum tolerable probability that one specific innocent user gets falsely accused, and with the maximum tolerable probability that the accusation fails to accuse any guilty user. The distributed code words can be arranged as an matrix , where the th row corresponds to the fingerprint given to the th user. Let be a set of colluding users. We denote by the number of colluders and by the matrix of symbols distributed to the colluders. The colluders use a (possibly nondeterministic) strategy to create an unauthorized copy of the content from their personalized copies. The unauthorized copy carries embedded data which depends on both the strategy and the received code words. Note that while , the attacked fingerprint (present in the colluded copy) cannot be expressed as a vector over , since multiple symbols may be detected in each segment. Table I lists the notation used throughout the paper.
B. The Combined Digit Model
Our model rests on the assumption that multiple symbols may be detected in one segment of the attacked content. The content owner is able to retrieve a list of all detectable watermarks in a content segment. This is in contrast to standard models, which assume the use of a detector that outputs a single watermark symbol (or an erasure) for each segment. 2 The following observations are critical: 1) Current watermarking schemes offer a considerable level of robustness; however, it is still possible to erase watermarks with a small probability, e.g., due to the addition of noise to the content. Thus, the code must be able to deal with erasures even in undetectable positions. 2) Watermark detectors have a small probability of "false positives" on the watermarking level: an attacker may modify content (e.g., by adding noise) such that a watermark is detectable even though a mark was never actively embedded.
For example, such a situation was encountered during practical experiments in [18] . Even though the probability of this event is rather small, the occurrence of false positives should be part of the model.
3) For big coalitions, the colluders have a large number of differently watermarked content segments available. The more symbols they have in a detectable position, the easier it is for them to erase the watermark in the colluded copy.
On the other hand, if they use averaging with an insufficient number of different symbols, then they run the risk that multiple symbols get detected. Both erasures and false positives have been addressed previously for several fingerprinting codes. The binary Tardos code only requires a modest increase in length 3 to deal with them [2] , [19] . In particular, the asymptotic information rate changes only negligibly as the false positive rate increases from 0% to 1%. When it increases to 10%, the asymptotic rate is still better than half the original rate. However, there is no formal security model that allows us to utilize information about multiple watermarks from the underlying watermark detector in the fingerprint decoder.
We define the combined digit model as follows. Let denote the set of different symbols present in the th column of . A subset of these symbols (denoted as with ) is used by the colluders to create the attacked segment . Note that the choice of is part of the attacker strategy. An important parameter for the strength of the attack is the cardinality . During the accusation process, a watermark detector is available that tests the presence of each watermark symbol in each segment and returns a set of detected symbols. We will write for the detector's response on segment when the presence of the symbol is tested: If the detector thinks that symbol is present in segment , then , otherwise . The combined digit model is parametrized through a number of different probabilities, representing the capabilities of the colluders:
• We denote by the false positive symbol-detection probability, i.e., the probability of the event , given that the colluders did not make use of the symbol to create the th segment of the attacked content (that is , which means that either none of the colluders received at position or they chose not to use it in the attack). We assume that this probability depends neither on nor on .
• We introduce different parameters for , where stands for the true positive symbol-detection rate when the colluders use different symbols in their attack on a certain segment. Formally, we define . That is, is the probability of the event when the pirates use symbols including . Again, we assume that this probability is independent of and . The attack model implies that whenever the attackers make use of different symbols in a segment, the detector will trigger on these symbols with probability , while the detector will only be triggered with probability on the other symbols. For , the detection probability is close to 1. We assume to be a decreasing function of . The choice of is part of the colluder strategy . 4 In all segments where , the detector does not see any symbol. This is equivalent to erasure. Note that the colluders have free choice (in a detectable position) to put a single symbol or an erasure. Under some circumstances an erasure is actually worse for the coalition than a clearly identifiable single symbol (see [6, Sec. 7 
.2]).
C. Empirical Justification of the Attack Model
In order to empirically justify the assumptions made in the combined digit model as well as to derive realistic values of the parameters, we performed several simulations based on the model of Zhao et al. [20] , using Gaussian spread-spectrum watermarking with a nonblind detector. The detector uses the statistic as recommended in [20] . Each of the -ary symbols in the outer (Tardos) code is represented by a random Gaussian signal of length 100, mean , and variance . The employed attack was averaging with added uniform noise, which is identified as the best known attack in [12] . Following [20] , distortion was measured by the mean squared error just-noticeable-difference (MSE-JND), and the attack was calibrated to give an average normalized MSE-JND of 0.01 per sample. The 4 Reminder: In the unreadable digit model, the allowed attacks in a detectable position are to choose any of the symbols in or to perform an erasure. resulting error rates from simulations with 1000 tests are shown in Figs. 1 and 2. Fig. 1 shows the false positive rate as a function of the detection threshold, plotted for several values of . Note that all the plots coincide, demonstrating that does not depend on , exactly as we assumed in our model. It allows us to express the true positive rate as a function of instead of as a function of the detection threshold. This is shown in Fig. 2 . As expected, this curve shows a trade-off between false positive and false negative, and is a decreasing function of . The curves in Fig. 2 can be used to provide realistic numbers . Table II lists values that will be used in subsequent experiments.
III. SYMMETRIC TARDOS FINGERPRINTING CODE IN THE COMBINED DIGIT MODEL
For the construction, we use a variant [5] of the "symmetric" Tardos code [6] , where the accusation process is modified to deal with the combined digit model.
A. Code Generation and Embedding
For completeness, we give a brief summary of the code generation and embedding steps, which are a generalization of Tardos' binary code [2] ; for more detail, we refer to [6] . The distributor produces an matrix of -ary symbols; the rows of the matrix correspond to the fingerprints for the individual users. The matrix is filled in a two-step procedure: The distributor first generates independent random vectors for , where the components satisfy 5 and . We use the notation . The random vectors follow a special case of the Dirichlet distribution, with
Here is a normalizing constant ensuring that . The expression stands for [2] . In the second step, the distributor generates the columns of independently. In the th column, the vector determines the probabilities of generating each specific symbol in the alphabet:
. Before the content is released to user , it is watermarked with the th row of the matrix .
B. Accusation
For each user , the distributor computes the "accusation sum" from , , and the watermarks present in the pirated copy. He decides that user is guilty if the accusation sum exceeds a threshold , where is referred to as the "accusation threshold." The list of accused users is denoted as .
We discuss two possible ways of computing the accusation sum. They both make use of the following weight functions introduced in [2] and (2) We will often use the notation and . The weight functions have the special property that
It was shown in [9] that this choice of weight functions is optimal for when Tardos' original asymmetric accusation is used. Furthermore, it was argued in [7] that it is unique in achieving statistical independence between the accusation of innocent users and attackers (for ), a desirable feature in a fingerprinting scheme. However, if the pirate strategy is known or can be iteratively derived from , , then it is possible to find better weight functions. Still, we will use the weights (2) in this paper because they perform well when the pirate strategy is unknown and they facilitate the analysis of the scheme.
1) Accusation Sum, Method A: The watermark detector is applied to the attacked fingerprint, for every location and for every watermark symbol to obtain the binary values . The accusation sum is computed as (4) where returns the value 1 if the Boolean formula evaluates to TRUE and 0 otherwise. Thus, in each segment each detected symbol gives rise to a term in the accusation sum. The collective accusation sum of the coalition is defined as
Here denotes the number of colluders who receive symbol in segment .
2) Accusation Sum, Method B:
We denote with (6) the set of symbols that are detected at content segment . The cardinality of this set is . We further introduce the notation and
The accusation sum is computed as
Thus, instead of adding a term or for each detected symbol separately as in method A, the symbols in each segment are grouped into two sets ("detected" and "undetected"), and user 's amount of accusation in segment is given by a single term or , depending on whether his symbol was detected or not. 6 The collective accusation sum of the coalition is defined as (9) ; the contribution of segment reduces to in both and .
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Symmetry of the Attacks
We make two assumptions about the attack strategy . These are the same assumptions as in [6] . 1) Member symmetry: All members of the coalition are equivalent. The colluders base their decisions only on the number of symbols they receive, and not on the identity of the members who receive them. 2) Column symmetry: The strategy for outputting the th segment of the attacked content does not depend on the number . That is, the same strategy is used for all segments independently. However, we do allow the strategy to depend on the full matrix . The first assumption is motivated by the row symmetry of the code generation and accusation procedures. The second assumption is motivated by the column symmetry of these procedures.
V. PERFORMANCE INDICATOR
The main collusion resistance performance indicator of a fingerprinting code is the coalition size that can be defeated by a code of a fixed length , for fixed false positive and false negative error probabilities and for a fixed number of users . The larger , the better the code. This can be re-expressed as the code length required to defeat a coalition of fixed size , for fixed false positive and false negative error probabilities, for a fixed number of users . The smaller is, the better the code. As mentioned in the introduction, the Tardos class of codes has length (10) where is a constant. Recall that denotes the probability of accusing a fixed innocent user, while denotes the probability that the scheme fails to accuse any of the colluders. In particular, in the -ary code of [6] , with chosen independently of and with , it was shown that the form (10) asymptotically 7 applies for large coalitions, with (11) where and are statistical parameters of the accusation: stands for the standard deviation of an innocent user's accusation sum and stands for the expectation value of the 7 The parameter appears in terms of relative order . These vanish in the regime , .
coalition's collective accusation sum. The result (11) holds if an innocent user has zero accusation on average. The symmetric binary scheme of [6] has and , yielding . Further improvements in the restricted digit model can be achieved by going to larger alphabets . We will use (11) as a performance indicator for the following reasons.
1) Equation (11) is an asymptotic result, valid in the limit of large . By the Central Limit Theorem, the addition of many i.i.d. random variables (the accusations per segment) leads to a total accusation score that tends to be normal-distributed. The assumption that an innocent user's accusation is normal-distributed is known as the "Gaussian approximation." For small coalitions the assumption does not hold, and the shape of the distribution becomes important. In [21] , how fast (as a function of ) convergence occurs to the Gaussian form was studied. This strongly depends on and . At large , may be required to get Gaussian behavior, while for small ( 5) and on the other hand convergence can be fast . For , a surprising situation occurs where the code performs even better than the Gaussian approximation predicts. Hence, even though (11) is not perfect as an indicator, there are still ample circumstances under which it predicts the code length with high accuracy, and sometimes it even errs on the pessimistic side. 2) We expect that in the combined digit model, convergence to the normal distribution is at least as fast as in the restricted digit model which was studied in [21] . In accusation method B, terms are added together that are precisely of the same form as in the restricted digit model. In accusation method A, the number of random variables that are added is larger than in the restricted digit model; this speeds up convergence to the normal distribution.
3) The derivation in [6] which gave rise to (11) is not limited to the restricted digit model (it was in fact immediately applied to the unreadable digit model as well); it merely involves bounding the area under the tails of the probability distributions for innocent and guilty users. Hence the derivation is also valid for general attack models (but of course with different numerical values of and ) as long as an innocent user has zero average accusation.
VI. DEFINITION OF EXPECTATION VALUES
The expectation value taken over all stochastic degrees of freedom will be denoted as . This includes both stochastic steps of the creation of , possible randomization of the colluder strategy (stochastic choice of ) and the random behavior of the inserted noise. We use the notation for the expectation value over the degrees of freedom, for the degrees of freedom (at fixed ), for the pirate strategy (at fixed ) and for the noise (at fixed ). The full can be expressed as . This order reflects the chronological order in which the stochastic events take place. However, other ways of computing are possible. In particular, in a number of cases it is convenient to first compute the expectation value over (the th row of , with user innocent), denoted as . The averaging commutes with the degrees of freedom and hence with and .
The consists of independent integrals, one for each segment . Omitting the segment index, we have for each segment (12) Likewise, the consists of independent summations over the counting variables , one sum per segment. The probability distribution is a multinomial. Omitting the segment index, we have for each segment (13) Here it is implicit that satisfies .
VII. PERFORMANCE OF ACCUSATION METHOD A
We first show that we are allowed to use performance indicator (11) by proving that the expected value of the accusation of an innocent user is zero (see the appendix of [5] ):
Lemma 2: In accusation method A, the expected value of an innocent user's accusation is zero.
Proof: We compute the expectation value of (4) over , the th row of . We make use of the fact that, for given , the (and, therefore, ) is independent of when is innocent, yielding (14) It follows from (3) that the result is zero.
Before considering the performance of the code for arbitrary alphabet sizes, we first state our result for the binary case.
Theorem 1: In the case of a binary alphabet ( , ), assuming and , the quantity (for innocent ) is upper bounded as , with (15) Furthermore, independent of the colluder strategy, the expected value of the collective accusation sum is given by (16) The performance indicator for method A is upper bounded as (17) Proof: We bound for an innocent user (note that and with are independent)
Here we have used the fact that all off-diagonal terms vanish due to the first property in (3). Next we split the double sum into terms with and terms with to obtain (18) Again using the first property in (3), we simplify this to (19) In the case of a binary alphabet, (19) reduces to (20) Note that . When , we have , whereas for , we have . This allows us to write the following strategy-independent bound: (21) Assuming that and , the second expression in the "max" is always larger than the first. The result (21) (15) into (11) yields (17).
Next we consider nonbinary alphabets. We first derive a bound on the variance of innocent users' accusation.
Theorem 2: For arbitrary alphabet size, the quantity (for innocent ) is bounded by , with
Proof: We bound 8 (19) as . Assuming column symmetry of the attack (see Section IV-A), we get . Next, applying to gives if and if . Thus,
This expression depends on the set only through the integer . Next we apply . We bound the result as
Note that (29) depends only on . It is independent of the colluder strategy and independent of all other columns except . Hence, in applying and we only have to deal with 8 When is small (see Table I for the notation ), the colluders' safest choice is to embed a single symbol. In that case, the product is zero with high probability. On the other hand, when is large, then the colluders do a powerful averaging attack yielding a small . In that case, the product is much smaller than . Furthermore, the product cannot exceed 1, as and . Hence we expect our bound to be reasonably sharp.
column . From here on we drop the column index . We can bound by
The is a function of . We use the following well-known property of Dirichlet integrals:
to obtain (32) Substitution of (32) into (30) gives (27).
The theorem does not depend on the colluder strategy (since the proof technique implicitly analyzes the worst case attacker).
Corollary 1: In the limiting case of the unreadable digit model ( , , for ) Theorem 2 reduces to . Proof: In this limit the terms in (19) vanish. Furthermore, (29) is trivially upper bounded by 1, yielding . The expression (27) looks relatively simple, but direct evaluation of the -summation would involve terms. For numerical evaluation, it is more efficient to split up the sum into a sum over and sums over the remaining degrees of freedom. After some painful algebra this yields the following result.
Corollary 2: The bound in Theorem 2 can be rewritten as (33) with (34)
Proof: We have to further evaluate the sum . We make use of the fact that the summand is fully symbol-symmetric, i.e., it is invariant under any permutation of the alphabet. This allows us to split into a sum over (with combinatorial multiplicity ) times a sum over the leftover counting variables which keep track of how the leftover colluders are divided over the symbols in . We have with , and . Thus, can be replaced by
In this representation, (27) becomes (36) where (37) We further evaluate by rewriting the constrained -sum as an unconstrained sum with a Kronecker delta in the summand (38) Finally, we use a sum representation of the Kronecker delta (39) with
, to obtain a factorization of the sums . The expression for in (34) follows. While this result looks far less transparent than (27), all the summations in (34) together require adding only rather than terms if we assume that . For large coalitions (and ) this can be a significant difference. Corollary 3: The variance of an innocent user's accusation satisfies . Proof: From (19) we see that is smaller than the expectation value of for some arbitrary column index . As and , it follows that cannot exceed .
We now return to the evaluation of .
Theorem 3:
In accusation method A, it holds for any colluder strategy that , with
Proof: Follows from (23) and (25). Note that the function is exactly the same expression appearing in the restricted digit model treatment in [6] . Setting , , in (40) precisely reproduces the restricted digit model result.
Having obtained bounds for and we can easily obtain a bound by applying (11) . Unfortunately, this bound is not as sharp as it could be, for two reasons: 1) In the computation of we upper-bounded the negative term in (19) by zero, which sacrifices some sharpness. 2) More importantly, a really sharp bound on the performance parameter would be obtained by a maximization over the colluder strategy:
. However, this is a very difficult optimization to carry out, as it amounts to optimally choosing a set as a function of , while the expression depends on in a very complicated way. We leave this as a subject for future work.
In Fig. 3 , is plotted for various parameter settings. We see the following trends. For each , the performance parameter has a minimum as a function of , just as in the restricted digit model [6] , with almost exactly the same values for the optimal . Furthermore, increases as a function of . This is expected, since the performance should get worse when the attackers become more powerful. A comparison between methods A and B is given in Section IV-F.
A. Performance of Accusation Method B
Similar to accusation method A, we first show that we are allowed to use the performance indicator (11); see also the appendix of [5] .
Lemma 3: In accusation method B, the expected value of an innocent user's accusation is zero.
Proof: For innocent , we have . Thus the expectation value of over is given by
It follows from (3) that the result is zero. We now quantify . Theorem 4: The quantity (for an innocent user ) is equal to 1.
Proof: We express as a double sum and note that all the off-diagonal terms disappear (due to column independence+ when the expectation is taken. Finally, the second equation in (3) is used. Thus, We can state a bound on the performance in the case of a binary alphabet as follows.
Theorem 5: In accusation method B, for the binary alphabet, it holds for any colluder strategy that (42) The performance parameter is given by (43) Note that is always larger than . Proof: We start from the collective accusation sum (9) and take the expectation value, making use of column symmetry (44) Fig. 3 . Bound on the performance parameter for accusation method A, as a function of , for , , and . In all graphs, we set , and according to Table II. Here the column index is arbitrary, and we will omit it when this does not cause ambiguity. The probabilities in (46) are given by and , resulting in . The value of the performance indicator follows directly from the definition (11) .
We now turn to the case of a nonbinary alphabet. Theorem 6: In accusation method B, it holds for any colluder strategy that , with
where and . The notation stands for the Hamming weight, and denotes the inner product.
Proof: The case is not nearly as simple as the binary case. Again we start from (44). Since and depend only on the colluders' degrees of freedom in , is equivalent to . Substituting (13) and (12) This gets rid of any strategy dependence. Consequently, the operations and have no effect on the bound. Next we reorganize the sum as in (35). In this way we obtain a bound , with
Finally, we write the expectation as a double sum: one over symbols in and another over symbols . We represent as a string (with if . We represent as a combination of an integer and a string . Here counts the number of detected symbols that the colluders did not have at their disposal.
indicates that the th symbol in is detected. Combined with the detection probability, this gives (53) where the notation stands for the Hamming weight of , and is the inner product . The quantities and are expressed as and . Substitution of (53) into (52) yields (47).
Unfortunately expression (47) is not very transparent. The main reason is that taking the expectation value is rather involved, as we have to keep track of both used and unused symbols in , which have different detection probabilities.
To obtain a bound on the code length we can again apply (11) to obtain . In contrast to method A, this bound is sharp. Furthermore, it directly points at a "worst case" pirate strategy that forces the content owner to use a low code rate. This is precisely the strategy that minimizes by choosing (for each combination separately, i.e., for each ) the string (which is equivalent to the set ) such that the expression after in (47) is minimized. Clearly this is not a trivial strategy.
In Fig. 4 , is plotted for various parameter settings. We see the same trends as in method A. For each , the performance parameter has a minimum as a function of , just as in the restricted digit model [6] , with almost exactly the same values for the optimal . Furthermore, increases as a function of , as expected. A comparison between methods A and B is given in Section IV-F. The results are also compared to the restricted digit model case.
B. Comparison
The numerical results are summarized in Table III . For each of the curves in Figs. 3 and 4 we have taken the minimum, and listed the optimal and value in the table. We have also included the results from [6] for the restricted digit model. It is clear that methods A and B do not differ dramatically. (That was also reported in [5] , where the code was studied for a slightly different attack model, and with a different performance indicator.) Method A is better at , and method B is better 9 at . What is most striking is that even a strong attack does not seriously reduce the effectiveness of the code. Compared to the restricted digit model, the code length has to be increased by less than a factor 2.5. We conclude that both accusation methods A and B are quite effective for dealing with the increased attack strength in the combined digit model.
The above results hold for the parameter settings of Table II , which correspond to the embedding and detection model of [20] . In order to get numerical results with a broader applicability, i.e., for different embedding and detection methods, we have also departed from Table II. Fig. 5 shows the dependencies of the performance parameters and for various settings of and choices of the alphabet size . Among the possible Fig. 4 Bound on the performance parameter for accusation method B, as a function of , for , , and . In all graphs, we set , and according to Table II. choices of parameters , we have chosen some that are similar to the settings used by Xie et al. [5] ; we furthermore fix a maximum collusion size of . As can be seen from the results, both performance parameters improve once decreases. This is expected, as a higher yields more powerful attacks ,   TABLE III  PERFORMANCE PARAMETER FOR ACCUSATION METHODS A AND B IN  THE COMBINED DIGIT MODEL, AND FOR THE RESTRICTED DIGIT MODEL.  THE LISTED IS THE OPTIMAL VALUE FOR GIVEN , FOR FIXED  .  PARAMETERS  ARE SET AS IN TABLE II which require larger codes to defend, which in turn yields larger (worse) performance parameters. The performance of accusation method B seems to depend less on than A.
Remark: The present work and [5] uses slightly different attacker models. While [5] assumes that the attacker always mixes the available symbols at each detectable position, in our model attackers can decide to mix in case it is favorable for them. This is particularly relevant to detectable positions where the attackers hold only a small number of differently watermarked sequences; if mixing is performed in this case, there is a high probability that more than one symbol gets detected, which gives more information about the colluders to the detector. This is the primary reason why [5] concludes that mixing helps the detector more than the colluders, while in the combined digit model a longer code is needed for defense; this shows that the attacks in the combined digit model are more powerful than the ones reported in [5] .
VIII. SUMMARY
In this paper, we have introduced a new attack model that follows the common approach of integrating a watermarking layer, which is able to robustly embed symbols in a carrier signal, and a fingerprinting layer, which provides collusion resistance. The attack model can cope with common signal processing attacks at the watermarking layer (such as averaging and noise addition) which occasionally yield erasures, false positive detections, and the presence of multiple watermarks in a segment of the colluded content. Through experiments we showed that the setup of the model is realistic and allows to capture attacks better than the commonly used arbitrary or general digit models. The main contribution of the paper is the insight that variants of the Tardos codes provide efficient code constructions for the new attack model, with only a modest increase in code length. This is in stark contrast to the inefficiency of the nonbinary Tardos code in the arbitrary digit model.
An important open problem is further performance evaluation of fingerprinting systems for emerging application scenarios, where large numbers of users need to be accommodated with code lengths limited by the number of content segments available for fingerprinting. Existing theoretical works mostly focus on asymptotic performance, whereas experimental approaches typically address up to 5000 users. It would be interesting to see a comparison of the concatenated system and spread-spectrum fingerprinting for applications that accommodate significantly more users, e.g., in the order of millions.
APPENDIX A EVALUATION OF THE INTEGRALS IN THE PROOF OF THEOREM 6
The integrals (49) and (50) are evaluated as follows. We have to compute a -dimensional integral of the form (54)
We split the -dimensional integration space into a part belonging to and a part outside . For , we write , and for , we write . The integration splits as (55) Furthermore, the two products appearing in the integrand can be split in the same way:
(56) With this split, each full -dimensional integral gets factorized into three independent integrals. The -dimensional -integral and the -dimensional -integral are evaluated using (31). The one-dimensional -integral yields a Beta function. Multiplying the pieces together yields (49) and (50).
